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AN OPENING FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN 
HEALTH INSURANCE AFTER THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
VALARIE K. BLAKE* 
Abstract: Section 1557, the civil rights provision of the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”), is unmatched in its reach, widely applying race, gender, disability, and 
age discrimination protections across all areas of healthcare. This Article will 
explore the value added of a civil rights approach to combating health insurance 
discrimination when combined with other ACA anti-discrimination efforts that 
were designed to regulate the health insurance market. It will emphasize the role 
that section 1557 can play in combatting healthcare disparities and will explore 
the utility of disparate impact and disparate treatment claims to those cases. 
Lastly, the Article will posit that two doctrinal limits weaken a civil rights ap-
proach to health insurance equity. First, it is unclear to what extent economic ra-
tionality is a permissible defense to insurance discrimination. Second, civil 
rights doctrine focuses on formal equality, which is of limited use in health in-
surance, where healthcare distribution must necessarily be unequal. Despite 
these limitations, section 1557 and civil rights in general will play a critical role 
in health equity in post-reform healthcare. 
“To put it simply, health equity is a civil rights issue.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) 
has potential to broadly remedy discrimination in healthcare. Section 1557 
prohibits race, gender, age, and disability discrimination by healthcare entities 
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 1 Vivek Murthy, 19th Surgeon Gen. of the U.S., Commissioning and Change of Command 
Speech (Apr. 22, 2015), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/swearing-in-murthy.html [https://
perma.cc/8XBM-W9XD]. 
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receiving federal financial assistance.2 As the first healthcare-specific civil 
right,3 the first civil right to extend gender protections to healthcare (includ-
ing protections for gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination),4 
and the first civil right to broadly capture the private health insurance mar-
ket,5 this provision represents progress for many different groups. With agen-
cy rules in development,6 advocacy groups are unsurprisingly turning to sec-
tion 1557 as a basis for arguing for broader rights in healthcare financing and 
delivery. 
Health insurers engage in conduct that may frequently be prohibited un-
der section 1557. For instance, is it a permissible form of discrimination if an 
insurer fails to cover Sovaldi, the infamous $84,000 Hepatitis C drug, or if the 
insurer limits availability to only the sickest Hepatitis patients?7 Can insurers 
pass some of the cost of expensive specialty drugs onto cancer or HIV pa-
tients through copays and deductibles?8 Can insurers network exclusively 
with providers who offer better reimbursement rates even if it means that cer-
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). Section 1557 
specifically applies Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), The 
Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92–318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (“Title IX”), the Age 
Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 94–135, 89 Stat. 728 (1975), and the Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. 93-
112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). 
 3 See Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health 
Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 859 (2012). 
 4 See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,172, 54,216 
(proposed Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). Department of Health and Human 
Services (“DHHS”) proposes that sex discrimination cover: “pregnancy, false pregnancy, 
termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom, childbirth or related medical conditions, sex 
stereotyping, or gender identity.” Id. The agency is also considering sexual orientation, but is 
taking comments about this prior to their finalization of the rule. See id. at 54,176. 
 5 See id. at 54,174 (stating that an “issuer participating in any Health Insurance Marketplace is 
receiving Federal financial assistance when advance payments of premium tax credits and/or cost 
sharing reductions are provided to any of the issuer’s enrollees”). 
 6 See id. at 54,172. The final rule was being finalized as this Article went to print; however, 
the final rule includes little substantive changes affecting the analysis and issues addressed in this 
Article. 
 7 See generally Soumitri Barua et al., Restrictions for Medicaid Reimbursement of Sofosbuvir 
for the Treatment of Hepatitis C Virus Infection in the United States, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 215, 215–16, 220 (2015) (discussing different state policies regarding reimbursements for 
Hepatitis C medication). 
 8 See generally Douglas B. Jacobs & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Drugs to Discriminate—
Adverse Selection in the Insurance Marketplace, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 400 (2015) (finding 
that a person with HIV in an adverse tier plan would pay $3000 more annually); PHRMA, AN 
ANALYSIS OF EXCHANGE PLAN BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN MEDICINES 6 (June 2014), http://www.
phrma.org/affordable-care-act/coverage-without-access-an-analysis-of-exchange-plan-benefits-for-
certain-medicines (then download report as PDF) [https://perma.cc/VTQ2-GYDE] (finding similar 
tiering for cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, and diabetes). 
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tain patients do not have adequate access to specialty doctors and hospitals?9 
Are wellness programs that shift costs from healthy employees onto un-
healthy employees permissible?10 Are ACA provisions that make premiums 
far more expensive for older smokers permitted?11 Can an insurer limit ex-
pensive services such as gender transition therapies?12 These are all current 
scenarios where guidance about the limits of permissible insurance discrimi-
nation is unclear. 
The ACA addressed discrimination in insurance through a number of 
provisions, mainly targeted at health status discrimination by private insur-
ers.13 Despite the ACA’s many successes,14 some forms of health insurance 
discrimination will persist. Section 1557 is another lens through which to 
examine the legal boundaries of health insurance discrimination because it 
extends beyond health status discrimination to protected class discrimina-
tion and health disparities. It reaches not just the private market but also 
public insurance—such as Medicare and Medicaid15—and many employer-
sponsored insurance plans.16 It creates new remedies and forums for com-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Robert Pear, Lower Health Insurance Premiums to Come at Cost of Fewer Choices, NY TIMES 
(Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/health/lower-health-insurance-premiums-to-
come-at-cost-of-fewer-choices.html [http://perma.cc/XS6H-MQQA]. 
 10 See Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings Through Cost 
Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFF. 468, 468 (2013). 
 11 See Alex C. Liber et al. Tobacco Surcharges on 2015 Health Insurance Plans Sold in 
Federally Facilitated Marketplaces: Variations by Age and Geography and Implications for 
Health Equity, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S696, S696 (2015), http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/
pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2015.302694 [https://perma.cc/8HQY-7GJ6]. 
 12See NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., STATE OF WOMEN’S COVERAGE: HEALTH PLAN VIOLATIONS 
OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2015), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/stateof
coverage2015final.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM4L-7KCT]. 
 13 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 
(2012) (restricting insurers in discrimination in enrollment); Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act § 2701, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (restricting insurers regarding discrimination in premiums); 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2706, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (restricting insurers 
regarding discrimination in benefits). 
 14 See Stephanie Marken, U.S. Uninsured Rate 11.9% in Fourth Quarter 2015, GALLUP (Jan. 7, 
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/188045/uninsured-rate-fourth-quarter-2015.aspx [https://perma.
cc/BYT6-P4RH]. In the fourth quarter of 2015, the rate of uninsured was at 11.9% of the 
population. Id. This is compared with a rate of 16.7% in 2013 prior to the implementation of the 
major market reforms of the ACA. See Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-
population [https://perma.cc/DDU6-MA2Z]. 
 15 See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,171, 54,172 
(proposed Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). Section 1557 extends to all public 
programs that receive federal healthcare dollars like Medicare and Medicaid, with the exception of 
Medicare Part B (Medicare coverage for physician care). See id. at 54,172, 54,175 n.16 (“A health 
program or activity also includes all of the operations of a State Medicaid program.”). 
 16 See id. at 54,189. 
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plaints.17 Additionally, section 1557 applies a different framework, explor-
ing health insurance discrimination through civil rights doctrine instead of 
regulation. 
Many of the early section 1557 complaints and lawsuits have focused on 
ongoing acts of discrimination by health insurers,18 yet no legal scholarship 
has addressed section 1557 in this context.19 This Article is intended to aid 
courts, litigants, and policymakers who are currently faced with section 1557 
challenges. The Article also initiates an academic dialogue about the promise 
and limitations of a civil rights remedy in health insurance. Though civil 
rights in health insurance are not altogether new (having applied to some pub-
lic programs in the past),20 they deserve renewed attention given that section 
1557 is more expansive than prior protections (covering gender discrimina-
tion and private insurance discrimination). Moreover, these broader protec-
tions are the new normal, a response to increased federal subsidies in 
healthcare that are likely to continue in the future.21 
The Article will proceed by first giving an overview of health insurance 
discrimination—why insurers discriminate and who is affected by the dis-
crimination. Part Two will detail the various efforts by the ACA to combat 
health insurance discrimination, including section 1557 and the ACA provi-
sions that reduce discrimination in premiums, enrollment, and benefits. Part 
Three will explore what the civil rights framework offers to health insurance 
discrimination, including how disparate impact and disparate treatment pro-
tections can reduce current examples of discriminatory conduct. Lastly, Part 
Four will describe doctrinal complications that may limit a civil rights ap-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-
1557/index.html [https://perma.cc/J3JW-YL3Q]. 
 18 See, e.g., Cruz v. Zucker, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (challenge brought for 
access to gender transition therapies); East v. La. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, No. 3:14-CV-00115-
BAJ, 2014 WL 8332136, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb. 24, 2014) (challenging the exclusion of Ryan White 
funds as payment for insurance premiums); Complaint from NHeLP & The AIDS Institute to the 
Office of Civil Rights, NHELP (May 29, 2014), http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-
publications/HHS-HIV-Complaint#.VyOVcNQrLcs [https://perma.cc/J8KL-7BTN] (arguing that 
drug-tiering of HIV drugs amounts to disability discrimination).  
 19 But see Elizabeth B. Deutsch, Expanding Conscience, Shrinking Care: The Crisis in Access to 
Reproductive Care and the Affordable Care Act’s Nondiscrimination Mandate, 124 YALE L.J. 2470, 
2490–2513 (2015) (describing section 1557’s effect on provider conscience provisions and gender); 
Watson, supra note 3 (addressing section 1557’s role in fighting racial inequality in healthcare); 
Sarah G. Steege, Finding a Cure in the Courts: A Private Right of Action for Disparate Impact in 
Healthcare, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 439, 452–61 (2011) (discussing whether there is a private cause 
of action for disparate impact cases under section 1557). 
 20 See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. at 54,172; see also 
infra Section II. 
 21 The broadening of civil rights law into private markets is a direct effect of these entities 
receiving federal dollars. Regardless of the fate of the ACA, some form of federal subsidy is 
present in most models for health reform presented by both political parties. 
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proach to health insurance discrimination. This Part will address whether 
economic defenses to discrimination are permitted and whether a civil rights 
vision of formal equality can appropriately address the unique needs of vul-
nerable patient populations. The Article will conclude by positing that ex-
panded civil rights in health insurance raise broader normative and theoretical 
questions that merit further exploration. 
I. CHARACTERIZING HEALTH INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION 
 Section 1557 presents a new opportunity to explore the boundaries 
between lawful and unlawful health insurance discrimination. First, it is use-
ful to briefly consider what discrimination means in the context of health in-
surance. Throughout this Article, I use the word discriminate to mean only 
that the conduct on the part of insurers treats one individual or group differ-
ently than another each time it makes a decision about limiting a benefit. A 
failure to decide to cover a new technology harms one group, but favors an-
other whose benefits remain. I do not mean to suggest that all insurers’ con-
duct is necessarily unfair or illegal, or in violation of either the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) antidiscrimination rules or civil rights law.22 A major chal-
lenge of discussing health insurance discrimination from a civil rights per-
spective is that discrimination is endemic in all health insurance: cuts will 
often be necessary. Indeed, an exercise of this Article will be, in part, to help 
define when this commonplace and even necessary conduct on the part of the 
insurer constitutes an illegal versus a permissible form of discrimination un-
der the current legal framework. Whether certain types of health insurance 
discrimination should or should not be regulated or prohibited, from a norma-
tive stance, is a question for another article. 
This Part will characterize the nature of discrimination in health insur-
ance, exploring why insurers engage in discriminatory practices, who is af-
fected by insurance discrimination, and what the consequences of that dis-
crimination are to individuals and groups. Ultimately, it will provide some 
context for the competing interests that are at stake when antidiscrimination 
laws are applied to health insurance. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See generally Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?, 
50 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (noting the difficulty of the term “discrimination” as used in 
regards to health insurance); Sara Rosenbaum, Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of Health 
Status: An Overview of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law, and Federal Reform Options, 
O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L & GLOB. HEALTH LAW 1 (2009), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/
farm/reports/reports/2009/rwjf36943 [https://perma.cc/UUN6-RF3R]; Mary Crossley, Discrimination 
Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 80 (2005). 
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A. The Framework for Health Insurance Discrimination 
Public insurance programs—such as Medicare and Medicaid—and pri-
vate insurance (employer plans, small group, and individual insurers) both 
have some interest in limiting services, though to varying degrees and for 
varying purposes.23 Public insurance programs aim to conserve taxpayer dol-
lars and to limit the need for premium hikes, whereas private insurers seek to 
maintain a profit and also to keep premiums low so as to be more competitive 
with other insurers.24 
Limits on health insurance benefits can occur at several levels: enroll-
ment (who is allowed to enroll), rate-setting (how much the covered party 
pays in premiums and in cost-sharing systems such as copays, deductibles, 
and coinsurance), the level of benefits (which benefits are covered, for whom, 
and at what level of cost-sharing), and at the micro-level (decisions about 
whether to cover an individual claim).25 Limits in any of these categories and 
in either public or private insurance can be seen as discriminatory even if they 
are arguably necessary.  
Civil rights lawsuits can play a role in both the private and public con-
texts. It is important to underscore, however, that these two markets are very 
different in both why and how they place limits on benefits. Public insurers 
have some interest in limiting healthcare usage.26 Limits in this insurance 
typically take place on the macro level: whether to cover new benefits or to 
retain old ones, or whether to reduce the generosity of some aspect of the 
available benefit because of cost, medical efficacy, budgetary constraints, and 
other factors.27 Public insurers are typically not able to discriminate based on 
who gets enrolled or specify the terms because the eligibility is often defined 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One Easy Lesson, 36 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 652, 652–53 (2008) (comparing a European model of “sickness insurance” that 
addresses ill health with our U.S. system that covers the healthy and avoids the sick). 
 24 See generally Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach 
to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (observing that 
“charging insureds rates based on their relative risk and covering conditions based on their potential 
costs are exactly what allow health insurers to profit”). 
 25 See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
 26 See generally Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 287 (1985) (discussing a state Medicaid 
agency that sought to reduce coverage for inpatient hospital stays when “[f]aced with Medicaid 
costs beyond its budget”). 
 27 See generally Jane E. Allen, Two Dead Since Arizona Medicaid Program Slashed Transplant 
Coverage, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/News/arizona-transplant-deaths/
story?id=12559369 [http://perma.cc/2AAN-EAWJ] (discussing a high-profile instance of Medicaid 
rationing that occurred when Arizona considered a statewide budget cut for certain types of organ 
transplants). Though Arizona was facing a deficit and argued that it had selected transplants with 
poorer health outcomes, public outcry was significant, with the American Medical Association and 
other groups speaking out against the practice and the state backing down quickly from the policy 
choice. See id. 
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by statute; for example, all persons over age sixty-five are eligible for Medi-
care.28 
Discrimination in the private market presents larger concerns because 
profits are at stake and insurers have historically had broader freedom to dis-
criminate (at least prior to enactment of the ACA).29 For example, underwrit-
ing has been a primary model in this market.30 Insurers extend or deny insur-
ance and tailor both premiums and cost-sharing based on data about the 
health status and likely consumption of healthcare services of insured indi-
viduals.31 The underwriting function is more prominent in the small group 
and individual insurance markets where there is less ability to spread risk 
across the group.32 In large groups, insurers still assess the costs of individu-
als and of the group, but the cost is better predicted because of group size and 
the ability to spread that cost among the group rather than place it solely on 
the individual.33 
Both underwriting and limits on services are generally seen as necessary 
at least to some extent to control for market imperfections that, if left unregu-
lated, could result in rising healthcare costs. One such challenge is adverse 
selection, a phenomenon whereby sick people are more likely to wait to pur-
chase insurance until they need it, leaving fewer healthy people in the pool to 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 2. Rosenbaum discusses the continuing role of Medicaid, 
and notes:  
In contrast to insurance markets, Medicaid coverage is available at the very point that 
serious health need arises. The law contains no eligibility exclusions for pre-existing 
conditions; many of its numerous eligibility categories are expressly designed to deal 
with coverage during illness; and states are required to provide for enrollment services 
in health care settings in order to enable enrollment at the point of health care need. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 29 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps and 
Border Crossing Techniques and How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 27, 27–
28, 74–75 (2011) (noting that, prior to the implementation of the ACA, states had primary 
responsibility to regulate insurance, with exceptions for federal programs and for ERISA-regulated 
employer plans). 
 30 See Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 287, 287 (1993). 
 31 See id. at 294–95. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got 
to Do with It? Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 436, 441 (2010) (explaining that conventional insurance inherently relies on underwriting to 
exclude bad risks and price according to risk profile). 
 32 See Crossley, supra note 22, at 84 (arguing that, while most people are covered by employer-
sponsored insurance, “[t]he smaller the group for which coverage is purchased, however, the more 
likely a health insurer is to employ risk-classification devices so that small employers seeking to 
purchase coverage are more likely to encounter the use of underwriting, coverage, and pricing 
mechanisms”); Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 380 (2003) (observing the price differences between large 
group and small group/individual insurance). 
 33 See Baker, supra note 32, at 380. 
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adjust for the costs of the sick.34 Moreover, through moral hazard,35 insureds 
are more likely to seek medical care once they have insurance. Because in-
sureds are paying a monthly premium for insurance, they are no longer bear-
ing the direct costs based on their individual healthcare consumption. There-
fore, they are more likely to utilize more healthcare resources.36 Without con-
trolling for these issues, premiums will rise and lower-risk individuals will 
eventually find that the cost of insurance outweighs its benefits.37 The healthy 
will leave the market and the sick will have no one to pool their risks with, 
creating a “death spiral” of ever-increasing premiums until, eventually, no-
body can afford the product.38 
B. Populations Impacted by Health Insurance Discrimination 
The unhealthy and those who face structural discrimination are frequent 
subjects of health insurance discrimination. These characteristics, while dis-
crete, can often overlap. Health insurance discrimination frequently centers 
on the health status of the individual, particularly in those insurance markets 
that engage in underwriting.39 Poorer health status may result in a greater 
need for healthcare services, which the insurer is incentivized to reduce.40 
Individuals or groups that are often subject to health insurance discrimi-
nation include those with bad health histories or preexisting conditions, those 
with a current illness (whether chronic or acute), those who may need exten-
sive preventive care to stay well, or those with features that predict an un-
healthy future (i.e., based on genetic history).41 It may also encompass those 
who desire expensive medical services but do not necessarily qualify or self-
identify as having a medical condition, such as those who use infertility ser-
vices and seek gender reassignment surgeries.42 Health status discrimination 
also includes those with bad luck and no control over their health status, as 
well as those with certain behaviors that correlate with bad health, such as 
tobacco use and obesity.43 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating to Promote Competition in Designing Health Insurance 
Exchanges, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 242 (2011). 
 35 See Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 11, 13 (1999). Moral hazard is an insurance theory that states that insureds consume more 
healthcare resources, once insured, than they would prior to being insured. See id. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 312–19 
(1997) (discussing the future of insurance health care coverage). 
 38 See Roberts, supra note 24, at 1165; Jacobi, supra note 37, at 317–19. 
 39 See Crossley, supra note 22, at 74. 
 40 See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 4; Crossley, supra note 22, at 76. 
 41 See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 22, at 14–19; Crossley, supra note 22, at 75 n.9. 
 42 See, e.g., Roberts & Leonard, supra note 22, at 15. 
 43 See id. at 6. 
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Arguing against insurance discrimination becomes particularly contro-
versial when discussing populations whose behavioral choices result in bad 
health.44 Some may believe that discrimination is fair if the individual has 
contributed to or has control over his or her unhealthy conduct, as distin-
guished from the person with sheer bad luck.45 But, it may be virtually im-
possible to draw a line between personal responsibility for health and a host 
of uncontrollable factors that might influence personal behavior,46 such as 
genetics or income.47 
Although individual traits such as genetics and health behavior can im-
pact health status discrimination, they account for only seventy percent of an 
individual’s overall health.48 The remaining thirty percent are the result of a 
combination of healthcare access and social and environmental factors related 
to health.49 Social factors include “the structural determinants and conditions 
in which people are born, grow, live, work, and age,”50 and extend to aspects 
of one’s life that are linked to health, such as an ability to earn a living, con-
sume safe drinking water, live in safe housing, have access to adequate food, 
and get an education.51 These factors play a significant role in the health of 
vulnerable groups. But, social discrimination and integration can also affect 
health status, as can access to health care—including insurance coverage, 
provider availability, cultural competency, and healthcare quality.52 When 
social determinants of health are not distributed equally because of structural 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See id. at 6–8. 
 45 See id. (noting that discrimination law frequently differentiates between behaviors within 
and outside of the control of the individual). For example, safe drivers do not pay more for the 
accidents of unsafe drivers in car insurance, so why should this similar notion not also apply to 
health insurance?  
 46 See id. The article states:  
[T]here are certain situations in which the law properly should treat individuals dif-
ferently based on choices that they freely and voluntarily make about their health to 
create an incentive to make better choices. At the same time, we want to carve out a 
set of health-related statuses, traits, conditions, or conduct that should be protected 
from disadvantaging treatment, regardless of their seeming voluntariness.  
Id. at 7. 
 47 See generally Youfa Wang & May A. Beydoun, The Obesity Epidemic in the United 
States—Gender, Age, Socioeconomic, Race/Ethnic, and Geographic Characteristics: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Regression Analysis, 29 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 6, 6 (2007) (finding that obesity 
is tied to eating and exercise habits, which can be influenced by socioeconomics and geography). 
 48 See HARRY J. HEIMAN & SAMANTHA ARTIGA, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., BEYOND HEALTH 
CARE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL DETERMINANTS IN PROMOTING HEALTH AND HEALTH EQUITY 2 (Nov. 
2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-beyond-health-care [https://perma.cc/U5UP-3BG7]. 
 49 See id. 
 50 Id. (citing Michael Marmot et al., Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through 
Action on the Social Determinants of Health, 372 LANCET 1661, 1661–69 (2008)). 
 51 See HEIMAN & ARTIGA, supra note 48, at 2. 
 52 See id. 
244 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:235 
discrimination, health and healthcare disparities result.53 For a difference 
across groups to rise to the level of a disparity, it typically requires a showing 
that the difference in health status is systemic, able to be altered through regu-
latory and policy changes, and involves past or present discrimination or 
marginalization.54 
Social determinants of health underscore the importance of a civil rights 
approach to addressing discrimination in health insurance.55 Age,56 race,57 
gender,58 and disability59 have all been linked to health and healthcare dispar-
ities,60 but disparities are by no means limited to these groups.61 Socioeco-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See Steven H. Woolf & Paula Braveman, Where Health Disparities Begin: The Role of 
Social and Economic Determinants—And Why Current Policies May Make Matters Worse, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 1852, 1857 (2011). 
 54 See Michelle A. Meade et al., The Intersection of Disability and Healthcare Disparities: A 
Conceptual Framework, 37 DISABILITY & REHAB. 1, 3–4 (2014). 
 55 See David R. Williams et al., Moving Upstream: How Interventions That Address the 
Social Determinants of Health Can Improve Health and Reduce Disparities, 14 J. PUB. HEALTH 
MGMT. PRAC. S8, S8 (2008) (describing impacts of the Civil Rights Movement broadly on 
reducing health disparities among racial minorities). 
 56 See Joel B. Teitelbaum, Health Care and Civil Rights: An Introduction, 15 ETHNICITY & 
DISEASE 27, 27 (2005) (arguing that patients over sixty-five experience under-treatment, are 
withheld surgery based on fear of bad outcomes, and are less likely to receive certain diagnoses 
than young patients). Healthcare can be withheld on the basis of age, because of bias about benefit 
and quality of life. See id. at 29. 
 57 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC HEALTH DISPARITIES AND 
INEQUALITIES REPORT—UNITED STATES, 2011, at 3 (2011); KAREN SCOTT COLLINS ET AL., 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, DIVERSE COMMUNITIES, COMMON CONCERNS: ASSESSING HEALTH 
CARE QUALITY FOR MINORITY AMERICANS 5 (Mar. 2002), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
usr_doc/collins_diversecommun_523.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS7B-8QZC]. Racial minorities are 
less likely, both adults and children, to have a regular source of medical care like a primary 
physician, are more likely to use emergency rooms, and are sometimes twice as likely to be 
hospitalized for preventable conditions. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra, 
at 1. 
 58 See RUTH ROBERTSON & SARA R. COLLINS, COMMONWEALTH FUND, WOMEN AT RISK: 
WHY INCREASING NUMBERS OF WOMEN ARE FAILING TO GET THE HEALTH CARE THEY NEED 
AND HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WILL HELP 1 (May 2011), http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2011/may/women-at-risk (then download report as PDF) [http://
perma.cc/5H7B-SLLR]. Women generally have greater problems with access on a variety of 
measures than men. See id. at 4 tbl.3. 
 59 See Disability and Health, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2020, http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/
topics-objectives/topic/disability-and-health [https://perma.cc/V7AX-779U]; CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 57, at 3. People with disabilities tend to have a greater 
chance of delays and difficulties in receiving medical care, higher rates of cigarette smoking, 
obesity, and high blood pressure, lower rates of appropriate breast cancer screening and PAP 
testing, lower rates of physical activity, higher rates of psychological stress, lower employment 
rates, and less social support. See Disability and Health, supra. 
 60 See Meade et al., supra note 54, at 1–2. For the purposes of this article, I define health 
disparities as differences in health, not necessarily confined to access to care, but influenced by 
“culture, life style, socioeconomic status, and accessibility of resources.” See id. at 1. Healthcare 
disparities are a “subset of health disparities that reflect differences in access to and quality of 
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nomics, where one lives, mental health status, and even religious and political 
affiliations can play a role in one’s overall health.62 Health disparities put 
these groups at higher risk for health status discrimination by insurers.63 
Though not considered directly by section 1557, health status,64 history of 
domestic violence65 and other features have also contributed to health status 
discrimination. 
C. The Consequences of Health Insurance Discrimination 
Health insurance discrimination can cause harm in many different ways, 
the most obvious being the physical and financial effects felt by groups that 
lack access to health insurance. Discrimination that leads to certain individu-
als and groups being left uninsured or underinsured, however, can lead to 
wider negative societal effects. This section discusses the health and social 
consequences experienced both by discrete groups and by society as a whole, 
as well as the distributive justice challenges of health insurance discrimina-
tion. 
                                                                                                                           
healthcare and can be viewed as the inability of the healthcare system to adequately address the 
needs of specific population groups.” Id. 
 61 See generally Ichiro Kawachi et al., Health Disparities by Race and Class: Why Both 
Matter, 24 HEALTH AFF. 343, 343–44 (2005) (arguing that race plays a role in some disparities); 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS ACTION PLAN TO REDUCE RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
HEALTH DISPARITIES 1, http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/npa/files/Plans/HHS/HHS_Plan_complete.
pdf [https://perma.cc/X2QK-C4KS] (discussing the disparities caused by race and ethnicity). 
 62 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 61, at 2. Likelihood of premature 
death in the United States goes down as income increases, while lower education levels correlate 
directly with income, smoking, and shorter life expectancy. HEIMAN & ARTIGA, supra note 48. 
 63 See generally Crossley, supra note 22, at 76 (describing how health status affects insurability). 
 64 See Jon R. Gabel et al., More Than Half of Individual Health Plans Offer Coverage That 
Falls Short of What Can Be Sold Through Exchanges as of 2014, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1 (June 2012); 
Wendy K. Zellers et al., Small-Business Health Insurance: Only the Healthy Need Apply, 11 
HEALTH AFF. 174, 175 (1992) (performing an empirical analysis of challenges for obtaining 
health insurance for small businesses in which preexisting condition was a primary barrier). A 
study conducted prior to the implementation of ACA market reforms showed that, in 2010, more 
than half of individual insurance plans would not meet new market regulations in force for 2014. 
Gabel et al., supra at 1. The average family in private plans paid $4253 out of pocket in “tin” 
plans (valued at less than sixty percent actuarial value), while the sickest families (the top one 
percent of consumers of medical resources for that year) in these same plans paid $15,346. Id. at 
4. Again in the tin plan, ninety-four percent of people had a deductible with the average amount 
being $5376 for single persons. Id. 
 65 See Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A Case Study 
in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 355, 360–61 (1997) (“Insurers and their 
defenders claim that because the battered woman is responsible for the increased risk of injury she 
faces, she justifiably may be denied health insurance coverage.”); Ryan Grim, When Getting Beaten 
by Your Husband Is a Pre-existing Condition, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2009), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/14/when-getting-beaten-by-yo_n_286029.html [https://perma.cc/TB8Z-
72QP]. 
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1. Discrimination as a Harm unto Itself 
Some forms of discrimination can be seen as a wrong unto itself, apart 
from any harm they cause. Prominent constitutional law scholar Larry Alex-
ander and others have committed significant work to the broader topic of 
what makes certain types of discrimination inherently wrong.66 Alexander has 
argued that discrimination may be inherently wrong if it is based on bias or 
inaccurate measures of social worth.67 He added that discrimination can be 
viewed as a wrong to the extent it feeds on or supports residual notions of 
bias against a particular group, or to the extent it systematically disadvantages 
a whole population rather than an individual.68 
Using Alexander’s framework, discrimination in health insurance, even 
that which disadvantages the unhealthy, may be viewed as less concerning 
than other forms of discrimination. Health insurance discrimination can be 
framed as not being based on bias or inaccuracy, but rather on an accurate 
depiction of that individual or group’s actuarial risk over that of another.69 
From this perspective, health insurance discrimination can be seen as a main-
ly economic enterprise—profit-driven in some cases, fund-preserving in oth-
ers. It can be characterized, particularly in private insurance, as empirics-
driven rather than bias-driven. 
Some scholars note, however, that discrimination by insurers can reflect 
the social worth of a given population, similar to discrimination in other con-
texts.70 Insurers’ decisions about which benefit to cut or which group to im-
pose higher premiums on are ultimately a tradeoff between helping one group 
and harming another.71 For example, an insurer might choose not to cover a 
new, life-saving cure for Hepatitis C patients, but continue to pay for a high-
cost cancer therapy.72 These tradeoffs can be laden with value judgments 
about the quality of life, the social worth, and the deservedness of some 
groups when compared to others.73 Moreover, to the extent that discrimina-
tion is wrong because it disadvantages a whole population, health insurance 
discrimination is problematic when it underwrites based on the assumptions 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, 
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153 (1992). 
 67 See id. at 159, 169. 
 68 See id. at 159. 
 69 See Stone, supra note 23, at 653–54. 
 70 See Elizabeth Pendo, Shifting the Conversation: Disability, Disparities and Health Care 
Reform, 6 FLA. INT’L L. REV. 87, 92–93 (2011) (describing differences in access to care for 
persons with disabilities as partly due to “stereotypes, false beliefs and invisibility”). 
 71 See id. at 91–93. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. 
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of the health of the group as a whole and not the individual.74 In so doing, it 
may create or sustain health and healthcare disparities. 
Health insurance discrimination poses concrete harms in that it may af-
fect an individual’s ability to access affordable medical care. But the experi-
ence of discrimination itself can also be seen as a harm if it is influenced by 
stigma, bias, or views of social worth. 
2. Distributive Justice and Health Insurance 
Regardless of whether any single act of health insurance discrimination 
is seen as an inherent wrong that is shaped by bias, an economic decision, or 
both, it nonetheless poses a fundamental distributive justice question. Taking 
into account the diversity of an insurance community mixed with healthy and 
sick individuals, the goal must be to allocate healthcare resources in the most 
just manner. Deborah Stone has famously argued that health insurance is a 
struggle over two ideologically opposed visions of fairness: actuarial fairness 
and social solidarity.75 The current system has favored actuarial fairness: that 
it is more fair to discriminate based on the individual’s risk.76 This way, the 
healthy do not unfairly have to pay for the costs of the sick.77 Social solidari-
ty, as a counterpoint, calls for society to pool the risks of the sick so that eve-
ryone shares equally in the burden of disease.78 Its broad goal is to allocate 
medical care according to need, not according to the ability to pay.79 The sol-
idarity principle recognizes that medical care will not be “distributed equally, 
in the sense that everyone gets the same amount.”80 Instead, people take 
“their chances that they may never become sick or need expensive care, and 
that most of their contributions will go to help the members who do need ex-
pensive care.”81 
Advocates of actuarial fairness argue that it is unfair to put the higher 
cost of the sick onto the healthy.82 This is seen as particularly true when some 
element of the ill health is considered to be in the control of the individual.83 
Opponents of actuarial fairness distinguish healthcare as fundamentally dif-
ferent from other insurance products because of its relationship to health, 
well-being, and social and civic engagement, and because individuals often 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See id. 
 75 See Stone, supra note 30, at 287. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. at 293. 
 78 See id. at 290–91. 
 79 See id. at 291. 
 80 Id. at 292; see Crossley, supra note 22, at 79. 
 81 Stone, supra note 30, at 292. Crossley has succinctly captured this dichotomy as the battle 
between “every man for himself” versus “one for all and all for one.” Crossley, supra note 22, at 80. 
 82 See Stone, supra note 30, at 293. 
 83 See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 22, at 22. 
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lack agency over their health status.84 Even where some element of behavior 
is involved, proponents may argue that individuals have less control over be-
haviors than society thinks because of socioeconomic conditions.85 
Stone notes that underwriting, as a practice, emphasizes the differences 
of individuals in terms of specific risks across discrete, select populations 
rather than the similarities in that every person is, in some way, fallible and 
vulnerable to risk.86 She sees this separating into different camps of risk as 
one of the ways in which the focus has ultimately strayed, ideologically, from 
social solidarity.87 Although early health insurance in this country reflected 
greater notions of mutual aid, this was in more homogenous populations 
where individuals may have seen their likelihood of risk as equivalent.88 
Broad health disparities across different groups could feed an unwillingness 
to pool risks, which could potentially underscore existing disparities for mar-
ginalized groups.89 As Stone notes, failure to include the unhealthy in the in-
surance pool is an intentional act on the part of insurers, society, and lawmak-
ers.90 Thus, Stone argues that it is imperative to cabin certain forms of dis-
crimination in the health insurance market to greater control fairness of health 
benefits across the population.91 
Ultimately, Stone is driving at a larger question—not just of health in-
surance—but of health equity. Health equity requires that every individual 
have the equal opportunity to “attain their full health potential” while no one 
is “disadvantaged from achieving this potential because of their social posi-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See id. 
 85 See, e.g., Roberts & Leonard, supra note 22, at 42. 
 86 See Stone, supra note 30, at 298–99. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See id. at 299. Early origins of insurance in our country more closely reflected concepts of 
mutual aid. Early insurance typically involved laborers (or their employers) where each paid an 
equal premium to be assured a certain amount of access to hospitals and physicians. It may have 
been supported to a certain extent by the fact that individuals felt equally inclined to the same 
risks. Even then, however, the model was critiqued for shifting costs of the old onto the young. 
British “Friendly Societies” were fraternal societies that combined member donations to fund life 
and health insurance for their members. See Baker, supra note 32, at 383. However, young 
members complained that their funds subsidized older members and that, without proper fund 
management, there would be no remaining funds left when they aged into requiring them. See id. 
at 384. 
89 See Stone, supra note 30, at 293. In a country where there is a thirty-five year gap between 
those anticipated to live the longest based on race and county of residence and those expected to 
live the shortest, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is an unwillingness of some to pool the risks 
of the others. Christopher J. L. Murray et al., Eight Americas: Investigating Mortality Disparities 
Across Races, Counties, and Race-Counties in the United States, 3 PLOS MED. 1 (Sept. 2006). 
The difference in life expectancy was so strongly delineated based on race, geography, population 
density, income, and homicide rate that the authors titled the article “the eight Americas” to 
express how strongly one’s quality and quantity of life depends on these factors. See id. 
 90 See Stone, supra note 30, at 293. 
 91 See id. at 292. 
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tion or other socially determined circumstance.”92 An inequitable system 
means that individuals’ different health levels are caused by a systematic and 
unjust distribution of resources that is socially-determined and avoidable.93 
To the extent that health insurance discrimination is influenced by social cir-
cumstances of the group or individual, this discrimination may be said to con-
tribute to greater health inequity, even as it might also be seen as necessary to 
maintain the function of health insurance.94 
3. Physical and Financial Harms to Individuals 
Some health disparities persist even when people have access to health 
insurance. Attaining insurance does not guarantee that an individual will 
make adequate use of the benefits, nor will it eliminate the discrimination that 
individuals may face in healthcare delivery.95 Alternatively, being uninsured 
does not necessarily mean an individual will be barred from all medical 
care.96 However, health insurance is typically viewed as necessary for regular 
access to preventive healthcare and treatment, and to shield oneself from 
medical debt.97 Health providers can refuse to treat the uninsured and under-
                                                                                                                           
 92 LAURA K. BRENNAN RAMIREZ ET AL., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
PROMOTING HEALTH EQUITY: A RESOURCE TO HELP COMMUNITIES ADDRESS SOCIAL DETERMI-
NANTS OF HEALTH 6 (2008), http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dch/programs/healthycommunities
program/tools/pdf/SDOH-workbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UHE-GTAM]. Paula Braveman has 
added to this definition, that health equity means no one is denied the prospect of good health 
because of their belonging to a group that is historically or social disadvantaged. See Paula 
Braveman, What Are Health Disparities and Health Equity? We Need to Be Clear, 129 PUB. 
HEALTH REPORTS 5, 6 (2014). 
93 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., DISPARITIES IN HEALTH AND HEALTHCARE: FIVE KEY QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS 2 (2012), http://kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/disparities-in-health-and-health-
care-five-key-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc/5V3T-MFRG]; RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 
92, at 6. 
 94 See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 92, at 10. 
 95 See Jane Zhu et al., Massachusetts Health Reform and Disparities in Coverage, Access and 
Health Status, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1356 (2010) (discussing health disparities in 
Massachusetts). Studies of health care disparities in Massachusetts after the 2006 reform suggest 
that, although insurance rates rose in minority populations, the greater insurance rate appeared to 
have no effect on health disparities. See id. While health insurance generally improves health 
status, in the Massachusetts context there was no increased access to a personal physician, which 
may have contributed to the ongoing disparities. See id. at 1359. Other studies support the idea 
that insurance improves access to treatment and prevention for certain chronic diseases but not all 
diseases. See Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon Experiment—Effects of Medicaid on Clinical 
Outcomes, 368 N. ENG.  J. MED. 1713, 1721 (2013). 
 96 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 14, at 6. They may be able to receive emergency 
care and may even have some care reimbursed through charity measures. See id. 
 97 See RACHEL GARFIELD & KATHERINE YOUNG, THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW DOES 
GAINING COVERAGE AFFECT PEOPLE’S LIVES? ACCESS, UTILIZATION, AND FINANCIAL SECURITY 
AMONG NEWLY INSURED ADULTS 12, 15 (June 2015), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/how-
does-gaining-coverage-affect-peoples-lives-access-utilization-and-financial-security-among-newly-
insured-adults [https://perma.cc/WV4F-DPLL]. One study showed only twenty-seven percent of the 
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insured, leaving them only able to seek emergency care at their own ex-
pense.98 The uninsured are more likely, in turn, to miss diagnoses of serious 
medical conditions99 and to experience unnecessary hospitalizations.100 As a 
result, the uninsured have higher rates of mortality than the underinsured.101  
Additionally, the uninsured and underinsured are at greater risk of finan-
cial insecurity.102 While nine percent of the uninsured had to declare bank-
ruptcy in 2014, only four percent of the insured had to do so.103 Credit rating 
is affected as well. In 2014, forty-eight percent of the uninsured received a 
low credit rating, as compared to only twenty-nine percent of the insured.104 
Underinsurance can also be of significant financial consequence.105 
A lack of insurance differentially affects certain protected classes for a 
combination of reasons, including structural discrimination, income, and oth-
er factors.106 Minorities and lower income people are most likely to be unin-
sured or underinsured.107 Moreover, women are less likely to have insurance 
through their employers,108 are more likely to have medical debt and to miss 
                                                                                                                           
uninsured received preventive care in 2014 when compared with sixty-five percent of insured adults. 
See id. at 12. 
 98 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 14, at 6.  
 99 See generally INST. OF MED., HEALTH INSURANCE IS A FAMILY MATTER 8, 96–97 (2002) 
(explaining the negative experiences that the uninsured have with the health care system). 
 100 See id. 
 101 See INST. OF MED., AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND 
HEALTH CARE 8 (2009). 
 102 See LIZ HAMEL ET AL., THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE BURDEN OF MEDICAL DEBT: 
RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 1 
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://kff.org/report-section/the-burden-of-medical-debt-section-1-who-has-medical-
bill-problems-and-what-are-the-contributing-factors [https://perma.cc/EUR2-JWXK]. 
 103 See COMMONWEALTH FUND, PROBLEMS OF UNDERINSURANCE (2014), http://www.common
wealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2015/may/pdf_collins_problem_of_under
insurance_exhibits.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD62-R9W9]. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See Paul D. Jacobs & Gary Claxton, Comparing the Assets of Uninsured Households to 
Cost Sharing Under High-Deductible Health Plans, 27 HEALTH AFF. W214, W214 (2008). One 
study found distinct differences in the amount of assets held by insured versus uninsured 
households, with many uninsured households not having enough assets to pay for cost-sharing 
requirements. Id. “For households with one uninsured member, less than half had sufficient gross 
financial assets to meet the minimum HSA-related deductible, only about one-third could meet the 
average deductible reported for nongroup plans, and less than one-fourth could meet the maximum 
out-of-pocket limit permitted by law.” Id. at W219. Bad health can only heighten the need to 
consume healthcare, which can further raise costs. 
 106 See, e.g., Marsha Lillie-Blanton & Catherine Hoffman, The Role of Health Insurance 
Coverage in Reducing Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health Care, 24 HEALTH AFF. 398, 400 
(2005). Related issues include less likelihood of obtaining a job that offers employer-sponsored 
insurance and inability to obtain insurance because of citizenship status. See id. at 400–02. 
 107 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 57, at 35. In 2004 and 2008, 
two in five Hispanics and one in five African Americans were uninsured. See id. 
 108 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WOMEN’S HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/womens-health-insurance-coverage-fact-sheet [https://
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necessary care than men,109 and continue to be likely to pay more for insur-
ance even after ACA reforms.110 The disabled and the elderly may be differ-
entially impacted by health status discrimination and by market innovations 
that push cost onto the chronically ill.111 Ultimately, discrimination by health 
insurers can further entrench disparities because healthcare becomes costlier 
and less available for those who most need it. 
Some scholars would emphasize unequal treatment in healthcare deliv-
ery as a more significant contributor to health disparities.112 They argue that, 
even if access to health insurance is equal, this may not remove the bias and 
implicit racism, or even the language barriers, that affect the ability of some 
individuals to obtain quality medical care.113 This issue is also ripe for section 
1557 lawsuits and future research should tackle these issues.114 
4. Social Participation 
Unhealthy individuals may be unable to live a full life that enables 
meaningful social and civic engagement.115 Philosopher Norm Daniels has 
argued that the value of healthcare is not only an end to itself, but also a 
means for individuals to engage more in society.116 An ill individual who 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/ZMX7-QDV7]. They are also more likely to have insurance as a dependent, which may 
increase instability if they divorce or become widowed. See id.  
 109 See ROBERTSON & COLLINS, supra note 58, at 5–8. Women are more likely to report 
missing necessary care because of cost than men. See id. at 2. 
 110 See Robert Pear, Gender Gap Persists in Cost of Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/health/policy/women-still-pay-more-for-health-insurance-
data-shows.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/J3L9-EKKL]. Gender gaps in insurance persist post-ACA, for 
example a thirty-year old woman pays thirty-one percent more for a health plan than a man in 
Chicago. See id. 
 111 See, e.g., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, COST AS A BARRIER TO CARE FOR 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/documents/cost_barrier-
tip-sheet--_phpa_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JNQ-XU7K]. People with disabilities are more likely to 
report cost as being a barrier to care than people without disabilities in every state in the country. 
See id.  
 112 See William H. Frist, Overcoming Disparities in U.S. Health Care, 24 HEALTH AFF. 445, 
447–49 (2005) (acknowledging this divide). 
 113 See id. at 446–47. 
 114 See, e.g., Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (a female-to-male transgender man alleging discrimination on the basis of 
gender when providers allegedly subjected him to embarrassing questions, harmful delays in care, 
disparaging comments about his hormone therapies, and painful genital examinations that 
continued despite the request of the patient that they stop). A number of complaints about gender 
discrimination in healthcare delivery have also already been addressed by the Office for Civil 
Rights. See OCR Enforcement Under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act Sex Discrimination 
Cases, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/
civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/ocr-enforcement-section-1557-aca-sex-discrimination/index.
html [https://perma.cc/4NFL-JEHT]. 
 115 See Norman Daniels, Justice, Health, and HealthCare, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 2 (2001). 
 116 See id. at 3. 
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does not receive medical care may be confined to his or her home and, as a 
result, may not be able to obtain employment or to engage in civic life, such 
as through voting. This is often raised as the primary reason for why universal 
healthcare ought to be supported in society.117 It is also often seen as the pri-
mary purpose for many civil rights laws—to enable members of society who 
might otherwise be subjugated to be treated as equals through participation. 
Even civil rights laws that involve accommodation, such as the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), emphasize enabling the disabled to participate 
in society.118 For these reasons, physical accommodations (i.e., ramps) have 
been emphasized over medical benefits (i.e., rehabilitation) to facilitate full 
social participation.119 
5. Costs to the Broader System 
Health insurance discrimination may also influence broader economic 
interests of society. Various types of discrimination by insurers might be seen 
as a way of keeping insurance costs low through market competition. The 
ACA adopts the model of managed competition set forth by economist Alain 
Enthoven’s famous article on the topic.120 In essence, Enthoven argues that 
competition is desirable in healthcare, but that it must be managed or regulat-
ed to achieve maximum efficiency.121 To eliminate discrimination against the 
unhealthy, Enthoven suggests a variety of weights to rein in the market.122 
Many of these antidiscrimination techniques were adopted by the ACA. For 
example, it established a community rating so that the same premium is paid 
despite health status123 and forbids exclusions based on preexisting condi-
tions.124 
Healthcare discrimination results in additional costs to the healthcare 
system. Apart from the toll of human suffering, health disparities and illness 
can not only directly affect medical expenses, but they can also have indirect 
costs, such as loss of productivity. One research team suggest that eliminating 
health disparities for minorities (African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics) 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See id. 
 118 See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12202(c) (2012); Ani B. Satz, 
Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 515 (2008) 
(explaining this distinction as a difference between civil rights laws that emphasize equality of 
treatment with a welfare model that emphasizes benefits for disabled individuals). 
 119 See id. at 515–16. 
 120 See generally Alain Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 26 
HEALTH AFF. 24, 29 (1993) (describing managed competition). 
 121 See id. at 30–31. 
 122 See id. 
 123 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2701, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012) 
(prohibiting discriminatory premium rates). 
 124 See id. §§ 2702–2705. 
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through equitable health insurance and other measures would have saved 
$229.4 billion in direct medical expenditures over a three-year period.125 Di-
rect costs (i.e., illness) and indirect costs (i.e., loss of productivity) of dispari-
ties, as well as premature death for individuals in these minority groups, add-
ed up to $1.24 trillion in costs over three years.126 Uncompensated care relat-
ed to the uninsured cost $84.9 billion in 2013, of which the federal govern-
ment paid $53.3 billion and the states paid $19.8 billion.127 
Regulating health insurance discrimination is a balancing act. Some 
amount of freedom by insurers to limit benefits may be seen as necessary in 
health insurance to control for market imperfections, to control for healthcare 
costs, and to promote competition.128 Through this particular lens, health in-
surance discrimination may be characterized as economically rational and 
unbiased to the extent it functions solely in that capacity. Some would argue, 
however, that health insurance benefit decisions inevitably involve some 
amount of bias, as the insurer must decide who to favor among a variety of 
groups. For example, they may consider whether to cover heart therapies but 
not HIV drugs, or fertility treatment but not gender transition.129 Moreover, to 
the extent benefit decisions equate with problems accessing needed medical 
care, society may end up footing the bill. And for groups subject to structural 
discrimination and health disparities, health insurance discrimination may 
perpetuate these harms and pose foundational health equity issues about just 
distribution of health benefits. 
II. EFFORTS BY THE ACA TO ADDRESS HEALTH INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION: 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) places restrictions on many of the 
health insurance practices that result in the inequities and disparities dis-
cussed in the prior section. It not only includes many antidiscrimination pro-
visions targeted at health insurance, but it utilizes section 1557 as another tool 
to examine which practices in health insurance discrimination are or are not 
legally permitted. A broad inventory of prior efforts to tackle health insurance 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See Thomas A. Laveist et al., Estimating the Economic Burden of Racial Inequalities in 
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 126 See id. at 235. 
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discrimination is beyond the scope of this article, but civil rights laws,130 oth-
er federal laws,131 and state laws132 have all made some efforts to protect var-
ious populations or to prohibit certain forms of discriminatory conduct in 
healthcare. No other laws have been as comprehensive in addressing health 
insurance discrimination as the ACA.133 
A. The ACA’s Antidiscrimination Provisions 
The greater part of ACA antidiscrimination measures address health sta-
tus discrimination in the small group and individual markets where health 
insurance discrimination has been the most prevalent. The ACA protections 
relate to enrollment and cost-shifting, allocation of benefits, and micro-level 
discrimination. 
1. Enrollment and Cost-Shifting 
Prior to the enactment of the ACA, insurers were not merely permitted, 
but incentivized, to avoid covering the healthcare costs of the unhealthy by 
refusing to enroll them in insurance plans.134 The ACA limits this discrimina-
tion by requiring both large and small group insurers, as well as individual 
insurers, to guarantee access to,135 and the renewability of, insurance.136 As a 
result, these insurers are no longer permitted to exclude enrollees from their 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
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 134 See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 1. 
 135 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2702, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012). 
Insurers are allowed to restrict enrollment to specific open enrollment and special enrollment 
periods. See id. 
 136 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2703, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2 (2012). 
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insurance plans on the basis of preexisting conditions137 or a host of other 
related factors such as health status, physical or mental condition, claims his-
tory (the number of claims per patient), medical history, use of health care, 
genetic information, disability, or other evidence of, or factors related to, in-
surability (i.e., history of domestic abuse).138 To avoid indirect discrimination, 
the ACA forbids advertisements by small group and individual health insurers 
that discourage enrollment of individuals with “significant health needs.”139 
Insurers also discriminate through cost-sharing or high premiums that 
discourage enrollment of the unhealthy or shift costs onto them.140 The ACA 
limits cost-sharing (copays, deductibles, coinsurance) with caps on out-of-
pocket expenses and deductibles,141 and imposes bans on lifetime limits.142 
Furthermore, the ACA prohibits discrimination in premium charges by indi-
vidual and small group insurers with some exceptions based on age, smoking 
status, family size, and geographic region.143 Group and individual insurers 
are also allowed to vary premiums based on participation in employer well-
ness programs with some limits to protect against overt discrimination of the 
sick.144 The ACA reduces any incentives for insurers to price-discriminate by 
limiting the amount of premiums insurers can keep for profit.145 The ACA 
also calls for redistribution of profits across insurers, readjusting from those 
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who better avoided the unhealthy to those who carried greater risk.146 Finally, 
because the individual mandate requires everyone to purchase insurance or 
pay a penalty regardless of how often they access health services, it guaran-
tees that the cost of covering the sick is spread across the entire population.147 
These provisions notably do not eliminate all forms of price discrimina-
tion. The statute itself permits some discrimination in premiums.148 Insurers 
are also free to design benefits to make full use of the annual out-of-pocket 
limits, meaning they can shift as much as $13,700 of a family’s medical ex-
penses in a given year back onto the insured.149 For example, insurers often 
implement drug copays for expensive prescriptions.150 Moreover, there is no 
clear penalty for an insurer who violates any of these provisions, except that, 
if caught, it may be prohibited from offering insurance plans on the ex-
change.151 Although insurers have the choice to abstain from selling plans on 
the exchange, insureds are only eligible for government subsidies if they pur-
chase within the exchange. Therefore, many insurers must rely on the ex-
change market. Insurers might also avoid these laws by selling only certain 
types of insurance, such as solely selling large group plans and avoiding small 
group and individual insurance plans. Ultimately, however, most insurers are 
not likely to change their business models to avoid civil rights laws.  
2. Benefits 
Healthcare discrimination also occurs when insurers limit which items 
they cover. Before the enactment of the ACA, these limits included capping 
of coverage for certain services associated with diseases that predict high 
medical consumption (i.e., an AIDS diagnosis) and limits on expensive pro-
cedures.152 The ACA prohibits the previously acceptable use of risk avoid-
ance strategies that evolved with managed care that indirectly evaded certain 
patients by avoiding their health care providers. This occurred through tactics 
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such as utilization review that was meant to avoid providers that proscribed 
higher amounts and narrow provider networks meant to eliminate high-cost 
providers.153 
The ACA provisions limit many of the ways insurers used to discrimi-
nate (for example in enrollment), so we may expect insurers to discriminate 
more in benefits.154 Protections against benefit discrimination are particularly 
important not only for this reason, but because, without it, many insureds who 
finally have been able to purchase and afford insurance may find that the in-
surance does not result in meaningful coverage. 
The Essential Health Benefits (“EHB”) provision of the ACA requires 
individual and small group insurers to cover a baseline level of medically 
necessary benefits with limits on cost-sharing.155 Thus, it creates a homoge-
nous insurance offering for all insureds that can only be added onto but not 
subtracted from. Although the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (“DHHS”) defines the categories of EHBs that must be covered, states 
define the basic package through selection of a benchmark plan.156 EHB pro-
visions are applauded in theory, but critiqued in implementation. Scholars 
argue that state benchmarks may not always be as generous and they risk ab-
rogating the goals of the EHB provision unless the Secretary of DHHS close-
ly reviews plans for compliance.157 
The EHB provision, as with the premium and enrollment reforms, is al-
so concerned with health status discrimination. In establishing the EHBs, the 
Secretary must not “discriminate against individuals because of their age, 
disability, or expected length of life.”158 Additionally, the Secretary must ad-
dress the health needs of “women, children, persons with disabilities, and 
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other groups”159 and periodically review whether individuals are having diffi-
culty accessing medically necessary services due to coverage or cost is-
sues.160 If an insurer discriminates against these groups, it fails to provide 
adequate EHBs.161 Although the groups mentioned by EHB regulations 
closely resemble those mentioned in premium and enrollment standards, they 
are not identical—for example, the EHB provision considers expected length 
of life while other provisions do not—and there is no clear reason why. Fur-
ther, there is a lack of internal agreement within the EHB standards about 
which vulnerable groups should be shielded from discrimination. 
Federal and state governments must monitor compliance through pro-
spective review when approving an insurer’s plan on the exchange or through 
retrospective review after a plan has been approved if, for example, an indi-
vidual files a complaint.162 Whenever a particular group has its benefits re-
duced, an inquiry might be made.163 Failure to comply with EHB regulations 
could lead to disqualification from offering on the exchange.164 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) reviews plans to 
determine if they are outliers with respect to drug benefits “based on an unu-
sually large number of drugs subject to prior authorization and/or step therapy 
requirements” impacting a specific category and class.165 In such outlier anal-
yses, CMS may discover discriminatory practices that are widespread pat-
terns across the whole industry.166 However, as health policy expert Sara Ros-
enbaum notes, CMS does not provide standards for how they will review out-
liers or provide guidelines for determining what are excessive or unusually 
high authorization steps.167 Moreover, they have considered, but not imple-
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mented, additional reviews for outliers with respect to out-of-pocket costs for 
specific medical conditions such as bipolar disorder, diabetes, HIV, rheuma-
toid arthritis, and schizophrenia.168 Review of such outliers for these high cost 
conditions might better capture efforts by insurers to skimp on benefits or 
avoid higher cost consumers. 
CMS provides common examples of practices it considers to be poten-
tially discriminatory. For example, CMS considers it discriminatory to cir-
cumvent coverage for medically necessary benefits by labeling the benefit a 
“pediatric service” when adults could also benefit from access.169 Additional-
ly, “refusal to cover a single-tablet drug regimen or extended-release product 
that is customarily prescribed and is just as effective as a multi-tablet regi-
men, absent an appropriate reason for such refusal” could be discriminato-
ry.170 Specifically, the single-tablet protection is designed to promote access 
for the chronically ill who are more likely to use these types of formularies.171 
Finally, CMS considers it potentially discriminatory to place “most or all 
drugs that treat a specific condition on the highest cost tiers.”172 Such tiering 
aims to avoid gaps in coverage for patients, but also to prevent insurers from 
avoiding a whole class of patients with a costly condition.173 CMS indicated 
that drug-tiering would not be discriminatory per se, but that “placing most or 
all drugs for a certain condition on a high cost tier without regard to the actual 
cost the insurer pays for the drug may often be discriminatory.”174 Insurers 
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are expected to base any limitations and exclusions on medical evidence.175 
CMS stopped short of calling any single practice discriminatory, instead stat-
ing that each individual case must be weighed within the totality of the cir-
cumstances.176 
The EHB provisions are a powerful force against insurance discrimina-
tion. But, without further federal efforts, they are unlikely to capture broader 
endemic patterns of insurance discrimination in the market. Furthermore, they 
are only as strong as their enforcement and state benchmarks and they do not 
extend into the large group insurance market. 
3. Micro-Level Discrimination 
Lastly, the ACA addresses insurer discrimination that might occur at the 
individual patient level. In these instances, insurers may use utilization re-
views and denials to decide whether a particular individual can access a par-
ticular service based on medical necessity.177 For example, the insurer might 
cover certain experimental cancer therapies, but may choose not to do so in 
the case of a certain type of patient with a certain type or stage of cancer. Alt-
hough this type of discrimination is individualized and less likely to reflect 
broad scale discrimination against populations, it is nonetheless a barrier to 
accessing necessary medical care. The ACA addresses this by standardizing 
benefits packages and establishing standards for due process in appeals for 
insurance denials to address discriminatory or baseless benefit denials.178 
B. Section 1557: The ACA’s Civil Rights Provision 
Although the ACA antidiscrimination reforms, taken together, relate to a 
wide swath of discriminatory insurance practices, they are limited in a variety 
of ways. Some forms of benefit and cost-sharing discrimination can (and do) 
remain, and many provisions only reach to the individual and small group 
market. Section 1557 provides another lens to explore the permissibility of 
other potentially discriminatory market developments through a distinct civil 
rights framework. Section 1557 represents a new opportunity to examine dis-
criminatory practices in health insurance and to fight discrimination in others 
areas of healthcare, such as healthcare delivery. DHHS gives section 1557 an 
aspirational mission to “advance prevention and wellness, reduce health dis-
parities, and improve access to health care services” in order to “ensure equal 
access to health care.”179 
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Section 1557 represents a significant expansion of the current civil rights 
framework that applies to healthcare. Civil rights litigation in healthcare has 
been fairly minimal when compared to other social programs, such as educa-
tion. Although civil rights laws are credited with desegregation of hospi-
tals,180 government reluctance to extend race protections to individual clini-
cians’ offices and to nursing homes,181 and repeated failures by courts to pre-
vent the closures of hospitals that adversely affect minority communities182 
are all seen as failures of the civil rights regime in healthcare. Section 1557 
presents an opportunity to reexamine the role of civil rights in healthcare and 
provides the first civil rights statute to represent a “health-specific” civil 
right.183 It also extends beyond existing civil rights in health insurance both in 
addressing discrimination by private insurers and discrimination by insurers 
on the basis of gender—including gender identity and, likely, sexual orienta-
tion.184 Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act provides that: 
Except as otherwise provided for in this title (or an amendment 
made by this title), an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited 
under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et 
seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 
1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 
et seq.), or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 
794), be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or ac-
tivity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance, 
including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any 
program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or 
any entity established under this title (or amendments).185 
This has broader remedies than the other ACA antidiscrimination provisions. 
Lawsuits, including private causes of action, are possible as are individual 
damages.186 Complaints may also be sent to the Office for Civil Rights 
(“OCR”)187 and can be resolved if the entity comes into compliance with sec-
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tion 1557 or, if not, the agency may suspend, terminate, or refuse to grant fed-
eral funds to that entity.188 Though OCR has been seen as an over-extended 
agency,189 the agency has pointed to its responsibility to enforce section 1557 
as a reason to expand its funding.190 
The reach of section 1557 with respect to health insurance is also broad-
er than other ACA efforts. A draft proposed rule published in September 2015 
clarified that section 1557 reaches all DHHS-funded entities.191 In the context 
of health insurance, this encompasses small group or individual insurers of-
fering plans on the exchange.192 Any insurer that participates on the market-
place and receives such funds will be covered by section 1557 for all plans 
offered on or off the exchange.193 Employer plans are regulated by section 
1557 if: they are administered by an insurer that also offers plans on the ex-
change;194 the employer is in the business of healthcare delivery or insurance; 
the business receives federal money to fund its employee health benefit plan; 
or the employer operates a health program or activity.195 Section 1557 also 
applies to Medicaid196 and to Medicare (except Part B).197 Additionally, it 
reaches to the federally- and state-facilitated exchanges and their decisions 
about which plans can be approved for offer on the exchange (and perhaps 
even their selection of benchmark plans).198 Thus, Section 1557 reaches vir-
tually all forms of health insurance. 
Section 1557’s proposed rule prohibits “denying, cancelling, limiting, or 
refusing to issue or renew a health-related insurance plan or policy or other 
health-related coverage on the basis of an enrollee’s, or prospective enrol-
lee’s, race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability, and the use of market-
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receive federal funds such as pharmacies, drug manufacturers, or healthcare providers, and the 
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ing practices or benefit designs that discriminate on these bases.”199 Section 
1557 does not require an insurer to cover a particular service, but “a covered 
entity cannot have a coverage policy that operates in a discriminatory man-
ner.”200 
Section 1557’s inclusivity may also be a weakness, as it is the “first 
broad based Federal civil rights statute incorporating the grounds prohibited 
by four distinct civil rights statutes.”201 This leaves uncertainty about how it 
can be used in court given the different standards, damages, and proofs of the 
various civil rights statutes it incorporates. The various titles differ, for exam-
ple, in whether administrative relief must first be exhausted or if one can peti-
tion directly to the courts,202 and whether private causes of action are permit-
ted for disparate impact claims.203 Although other antidiscrimination stand-
ards may address some of these claims, section 1557 provides a broader, 
more public, and potentially more rapid, option that permits a different, but 
critical, group to receive protections from discriminatory insurance practices. 
III. SECTION 1557’S LEGAL PROTECTIONS IN HEALTH INSURANCE 
As gaps in the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) insurance protections are 
identified, advocates are turning to section 1557 to expand the definition of 
discriminatory conduct in health insurance. This Part will explore the legal 
framework by which section 1557, as a civil rights tool, will engage questions 
of health insurance discrimination. It will argue that section 1557 has the po-
tential to reduce health insurance discrimination that affects both protected 
classes and the unhealthy. 
A. Protected Class Discrimination 
Other ACA provisions mainly combat health status discrimination in 
health insurance, with very little attention paid to protected classes. For ex-
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ample, another provision of the ACA forbids discrimination in enrollment by 
insurers against the disabled and a variety of categories of health status, but is 
silent on age, gender, or race.204 Although other provisions of the ACA pro-
hibit varying premiums based on gender, race, or disability, these groups are 
not specifically listed within section 1557. Instead, gender, race, and age 
groups are protected through a negative inference because they are not in-
cluded as part of the few permissible categories in which insurers may dis-
criminate.205 Protected classes were also not addressed in Essential Health 
Benefits (“EHB”) provisions, except some mentions of age, disability, and 
women’s health.206 
Section 1557 both legally and symbolically recognizes protected class 
discrimination as its own distinct form of discrimination that mandates pro-
tection above and beyond the other antidiscrimination efforts of the ACA. It 
uniformly makes protected class discrimination an issue across premiums, 
cost-sharing, and benefits. Furthermore, it provides eight distinct lenses 
through which to engage the legal limits of health insurance discrimination: 
race, gender, disability, and age, with a disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment theory for each of these four protected classes. Disparate impact and 
disparate treatment actions are common factors in civil rights frameworks, 
and Section 1557’s inclusion of these factors indicates that it will likely fol-
low other civil rights frameworks. Title VI, Title IX, the Age Discrimination 
Act, and the Rehabilitation Act are all similar in their legal mechanisms, so 
their inclusion under section 1557 will function in similar ways. Given that 
there are eight frameworks, it is impractical to focus on each individually, 
thus this Article will attempt to generalize and demonstrate the broader im-
pact of section 1557 on health insurance discrimination overall.  
1. Disparate Treatment and Section 1557 
Disparate treatment claims address intentional discrimination; these 
claims result from similarly situated individuals being treated differently on 
the basis of membership in a protected class.207 In such a claim, the plaintiffs 
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must show that the defendant knew of the individual’s membership in the 
protected class and treated the plaintiff differently because of it.208 When a 
case of discrimination has been made, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
“articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged ac-
tion.”209 The plaintiff can then still argue that the nondiscriminatory reason is 
a pretext for discrimination, and that the actual purpose is to discriminate 
based on protected class.210 Plaintiffs may also allege that the defendant en-
gaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory conduct and may prove it by 
showing that the defendant engaged in classification on the basis of protected 
class.211 
Though many discriminatory behaviors in the small and individual mar-
kets have been addressed by the ACA’s other antidiscrimination efforts, some 
alleged discrimination continues post-reform and is ripe for reexamination 
under Section 1557. For example, insurers have begun utilizing drug-tiering 
following the enactment of the ACA. Not explicitly forbidden by the ACA, it 
is a common practice, often used to discourage consumers from choosing 
higher cost drugs where generics are available.212 Patients with high-cost 
conditions such as HIV or multiple sclerosis are able to purchase insurance 
because of the bans on discrimination in enrollment against the unhealthy.213 
Yet, in filling their prescriptions for specialty drugs, these individuals face 
higher co-pays or must purchase coinsurance to obtain their needed drugs.214 
These drugs may also be subject to higher administrative review based on the 
type of drug and whether it is generic.215 The rise in popularity of drug-tiering 
since the enactment of the ACA may reflect unfair cost-shifting onto the un-
healthy or a way of subversively discouraging enrollment of chronically ill 
patients.216 These patients may pay as much as $3000 more per year for nec-
essary medications, on top of their other out-of-pocket medical costs and 
premiums.217 The cost could lead individuals to take their medication inter-
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mittently, which can lead to drug resistance.218 Although out-of-pocket max-
imums provide some relief, patients with chronic conditions may find them-
selves hitting their maximum each year, and may face medical debt even with 
health insurance. 
Advocacy groups have begun taking a stand against drug-tiering. In a 
complaint filed with the Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), the AIDS Institute 
and the National Health Law Program (“NHeLP”) challenged drug-tiering 
against patients with HIV as a violation of section 1557 on the basis of disa-
bility.219 In that situation, the tiers required copayments, higher coinsurance, 
and preapprovals for all HIV drugs, regardless of each drug’s price.220 The 
National Multiple Sclerosis Society filed a similar complaint about tiering to 
the Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance.221 Relatedly, patient 
advocacy group I Am (Still) Essential critiqued the EHB provisions for fail-
ing to cover important drugs and for allowing the removal of non-EHB drugs 
at any point in the year.222 
The EHB regulations suggest that “placing most or all drugs for a cer-
tain condition on a high-cost tier without regard to the actual cost the insurer 
pays for the drug may often be discriminatory.”223 Section 1557 provides a 
platform to engage with this issue by opening discussion about whether this 
type of discrimination is forbidden even if it is economically justified.224 
Moreover, it allows for a new remedy. In the complaint to the Montana 
Commissioner of Securities and Insurance, the government interfered to regu-
late drug tiering rather than leaving it to OCR to handle.225 The State Com-
missioner found the pricing to be discriminatory and now requires an ex-
change to have at least one plan available with a fixed copayment for all 
drugs.226 Additionally, section 1557 allows for public complaint, which may 
put additional pressure on insurers and states to reform practices.227 Although 
OCR has not commented on the NHeLP complaint, three of the four insurers 
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still reduced copays for some HIV medications. NHeLP notes, however, that 
these changes were prompted by settlements with the state’s insurance com-
missioner that only apply to that state for that year, that they did not impact 
the civil rights charges, and that the insurers did not admit any wrongdoing.228 
Moreover, section 1557 can extend protections beyond the EHB provi-
sions, which only forbid tiering based on disease.229 Section 1557 can also 
address tiering that directly discriminates against any of the protected classes, 
for example, if an insurer charged a higher copay for one gender or for adults 
versus children. Additionally, it may challenge mid-year removal of a class-
based drug that affects a certain disabled population or racial group. Refusals 
to cover certain procedures for one group when they are available to others 
may also implicate section 1557. Section 1557’s proposed rule provides, as an 
example: “a plan that covers inpatient treatment for eating disorders in men 
but not women would not be in compliance with the prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on sex.”230 In this situation, section 1557 seeks equality in cov-
erage; if the insurer is offering the benefit to some, then it must offer the ben-
efit to all in order to satisfy the broader goals of disparate treatment claims. 
This particular aspect of the law has major ramifications for gender and sexu-
ality-based discrimination, particularly discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation or gender identity. 
In Cruz v. Zucker, New York State’s Medicaid agency refused to cover 
gender reassignment surgeries for individuals below the age of eighteen (or 
below age twenty-one if the procedure would result in sterility).231 A class of 
transgender patients alleged discrimination under section 1557 on the basis of 
gender and disability because “certain services [were] available to non-
transgender people but denied to transgender people where medically neces-
sary.”232 The court dismissed this particular claim because plaintiffs failed to 
allege that other people who were not transgender were actually receiving 
access to care that transgender persons were not. For example, the plaintiffs 
were seeking tracheal shaves to remove Adam’s apples and breast augmenta-
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tion. These examples demonstrate the challenges that such patients may face 
under a civil rights framework. Although some non-transgender patients may 
receive breast augmentation, it is often cosmetic and they would have to show 
that some individuals are receiving the surgery under Medicaid, perhaps as 
reconstructive surgery following cancer treatment. A tracheal shave, however, 
is unlikely to be sought by any patients that are not transgender.233 
This question of equality in access to benefits can be broadened. For ex-
ample, if a plan covers hormone treatments for menopause, must it also cover 
them for transgender patients? If it covers fertility preservation services for 
cancer patients, must it cover these for gender transition surgeries? The Na-
tional Women’s Law Center (“NWLC”) has shown that at least ninety-two 
insurance plans around the country exclude transition surgery, with some 
states selecting an EHB benchmark plan that also excludes such services.234 
Section 1557 not only permits challenges to these practices, but its proposed 
rule also indicates that insurers must cover at least some aspects of transition 
medicine, whether it be hormone treatments, transition surgery, or others.235 
In the past, it was common practice to deny patients access to medically 
necessary care based on their gender identity, rather than based on their phys-
iological need.236 For example, an insurer might fail to cover ovarian cancer 
treatment for an individual who was born biologically female because he 
identifies as male legally. The proposed rule of section 1557 prohibits this 
type of conduct as discriminatory on the basis of gender, and it will be imper-
ative for ensuring access to preventative care for transgender patients.237 For 
example, a wellness program in Colorado changed its policies in response to 
an OCR investigation stemming from allegations that its funding for mam-
mograms and gynecologic exams only extended to individuals who were bio-
logically female.238 Because a viable claim could be made that this practice 
violated section 1557 on the basis of gender, the policy was changed to in-
clude the provision of services to transgender women who are taking hor-
mones.239 Similarly, the proposed rule also forbids an insurer from denying 
services because the requested service does not correlate with the individual’s 
sex as identified at birth.240 The NWLC has also identified a number of other 
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insurance practices that can be considered violations of section 1557 based on 
gender.241 
Section 1557 provides significant protections for transgender patients 
who have never enjoyed such protections for access to transgender care or to 
even some basic preventative care. It is no coincidence that, of roughly four 
hundred public comments to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (“DHHS”) in the initial period for the proposed rule, more than half 
were submitted by transgender patients describing their personal experiences 
with discrimination in healthcare,242 and a significant remainder dealt with 
special issues concerning gay and lesbian individuals.243 
 A case in Connecticut demonstrates the potential of utilizing section 
1557 with respect to age. The state recently altered a law to prevent it from 
being seen as facially discriminatory on the basis of age.244 The state had pre-
viously mandated that insurers cover diagnosis and treatment of infertility for 
persons under forty years old.245 The age cap was instituted in response to 
medical data available at the time of the law’s enactment that suggested that 
persons over forty years old did not medically benefit from fertility treat-
ment.246 Relying on both section 1557 and the EHB regulations that define 
medically-unsupported age caps as discriminatory, Connecticut amended this 
law to remove any age cap and cited new medical data that supports the use 
of fertility medicine for those over forty years old.247 Challenges may also be 
made to plans that exclude dependent enrollees from maternity care, coverage 
for labor and delivery outside of the service area, coverage of breast pumps 
and BRCA testing, and birth control methods.248 
Antidiscrimination provisions in the ACA have been critiqued for some-
times allowing discrimination on the basis of protected class. For example, 
the rate-setting provisions explicitly allow some ongoing discrimination in 
premiums based on geography, age, and tobacco use.249 One study suggests 
that, although these rate differences may not greatly affect prices for young 
tobacco users, they could pose significant access issues for elderly tobacco 
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users.250 For this reason, section 1557 age discrimination claims could possi-
bly be brought in response to these exclusion exceptions. 
Section 1557’s strength is in the expansion of protections for new groups 
never before covered by civil rights laws in health insurance. Particularly to 
the extent discrimination is a wrong because it involves bias or ongoing sub-
jugation of certain groups, section 1557 asserts an important right in the battle 
over health insurance discrimination. Many states did not provide protections 
for gender or age prior to the adoption of the ACA,251 and this opens up a 
plethora of opportunities for protection that never existed before. Disparate 
treatment claims allow protected classes to challenge discrimination in both 
premiums and benefits to the extent that they can prove some form of inten-
tional categorization. 
2. Disparate Impact and Section 1557 
Under a second theory, plaintiffs can claim disparate impact, or discrim-
ination by effect.252 This refers to situations where a defendant “uses a neutral 
procedure or practice that has a disparate impact on protected individuals, and 
such practice lacks a substantial legitimate justification.”253 The focus is not 
on intent, but on outcomes.254 Disparate impact cases can be harder to prove 
and some scholars argue that the viability of disparate impact claims has been 
eroding over time.255 As Sidney Watson notes, disparate impact claims are 
meant to achieve different goals. While disparate treatment theory emphasiz-
es equal treatment of different groups as the way to achieve equality, dispar-
ate impact theory emphasizes equal opportunity and “an affirmative duty on 
defendants to heed the disproportionate consequences of their policies be-
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cause . . . arbitrary or thoughtless policies can be just as harmful as intentional 
discrimination.”256  
Many insurance practices may be better characterized as discriminatory 
by effect, not by design.257 Insurers can often accomplish the same end—that 
of avoiding the unhealthy or a protected group—through neutral means that 
do not categorize based on protected class.258 For example, though insurers 
may not be able to avoid HIV patients by tiering based on disease status, they 
may still be able to accomplish the same effect by tiering drugs based on 
price. This makes disparate impact claims, which examine the effect and not 
the intent of certain practices, very important in the context of health insur-
ance discrimination. 
With a disparate impact claim, a patient could still challenge tiering even 
if it were based on price and not disability or illness. The claim would require 
the patient or group of patients to show that the practice of tiering a given 
drug was not intentionally harmful, but nonetheless had a statistical effect on 
the protected group. For instance, the practice of placing a certain pain medi-
cation in an expensive formulary impacted patients with a multiple sclerosis 
diagnosis more than those without multiple sclerosis, thus constituting dis-
crimination on the basis of disability. Insurers then could defend this practice 
by arguing that they had a legitimate justification for placing the drug on that 
price tier.259 
Additionally, wellness plans are a health insurance practice ripe for dis-
parate impact challenge under section 1557. The ACA permits these employ-
er-sponsored health insurance plans to adjust premiums based on health status 
by as much as thirty percent.260 For instance, a person who performs better 
than another on a cholesterol measurement may be permitted to pay thirty 
percent less in premiums.261 Some scholars argue that wellness plans may 
function as stand-ins for discriminating against the unhealthy in healthcare 
premiums because they essentially shift costs from the employer and healthy 
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employees onto unhealthy employees.262 Claims could be constructed around 
protected class if, for instance, particular groups are able to argue that it 
would be harder for them to achieve a certain cholesterol reading than others. 
In this way, again, section 1557 might challenge a practice as discriminatory 
that the ACA itself permits. Although other cases have challenged the permis-
sibility of these practices under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
they were exempted because the ADA permits discrimination based on valid 
underwriting.263 However, section 1557 uses the Rehabilitation Act rather 
than the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act does not have the same exemption for 
underwriting, and thus allows for a reexamination of this issue. 
Furthermore, narrow provider networks are a common feature in the 
post-ACA insurance market.264 Insurers compete for better reimbursement 
rates by limiting their networks to an exclusive group of providers.265 Many 
have argued that these market innovations can harm the chronically ill, par-
ticularly to the extent that they bar access for tertiary and quaternary care.266 
These practices will likely not be seen as intentionally discriminatory because 
they do not overtly prohibit any particular group from enrollment. They can 
be discriminatory by effect, however, if they discourage enrollment by partic-
ular groups or affect the level of care certain groups have access to.267 
Many of the other examples discussed in relation to disparate treatment 
could also be framed as disparate impact cases. The plaintiffs in Cruz v. Zuck-
er might not be able to show that other patients will ever receive a Medicaid-
covered tracheal shave, but, they may still argue that “regardless of the avail-
ability of these treatments to people generally, these coverage exclusions have 
a disparate impact on transgender people for whom these services are medi-
cally necessary.”268 In other words, this treatment is unique to transgender 
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patients and a failure to cover it leads to disparate harms for only that popula-
tion. 
Disparate impact claims will likely be the lifeblood of successful section 
1557 claims. However, there is uncertainty about whether private causes of 
action for disparate impact are permitted under section 1557.269 All of the 
civil rights statutes encompassed by section 1557 permit suits that allege dis-
parate impact claims, but Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (Title VI) does not 
permit private causes of action, meaning that OCR, and not an individual, 
may bring a disparate impact claim.270  
The first district courts to hear section 1557 claims have been split on 
this issue. In Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Minnesota held that section 1557 was ambiguous “insofar as 
each of the four statutes utilize different standards for determining liability, 
causation, and a plaintiff’s burden of proof.”271 The court agreed with scholar 
Sidney Watson that “Congress intended to create a new health-specific, anti-
discrimination cause of action that is subject to a singular standard, regardless 
of a plaintiff’s protected class.”272 The court neglected to name that standard 
but emphasized that, whatever the standard, it should be tethered to existing 
civil rights jurisprudence.273 To not have a single standard, according to the 
court, would lead to absurd inconsistency and would be particularly challeng-
ing in the case of intersectional discrimination, where discrimination is based 
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on the interaction of multiple classes.274 The U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania disagreed in Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans-
portation Authority v. Gilead Sciences, holding that, although Congress in-
tended a private right of action under section 1557, the standards and burdens 
of proof will vary within section 1557 for whichever protected class is being 
claimed.275 Thus, although the plaintiffs argued that they experienced dispar-
ate impact on the basis of race, the court would not consider the argument 
because Title VI typically does not allow a private cause of action for dispar-
ate impact.276 The proposed rule for section 1557 suggests that private causes 
of action and damages should be allowed where the original civil rights law 
allows it.277 Moreover, private rights of action are available against Title I 
ACA entities, such as the state or federal marketplaces.278 
A resolution of the legal question of which legal standards apply to sec-
tion 1557 cases is necessary for the sake of both courts and litigants. The 
question of whether to allow disparate impact cases, in particular, poses basic 
questions of fairness that need to be resolved for this law and for other future 
civil rights statutes that might incorporate multiple existing civil rights stat-
utes.279 If section 1557 truly focuses on broad discrimination in healthcare, it 
seems unfair that some groups have more legal actions available to them than 
others. Is it not more equitable to suggest that, in crafting section 1557, Con-
gress recognized that discrimination in public funds in healthcare was an ex-
pansive issue and, for this reason, intended to provide all four groups an equal 
shot at litigating disparate impact claims? Undoubtedly, with an overtasked 
OCR, there is some real risk that racial inequities will not be as easily re-
solved without permitting private causes of action in these cases. 
B. Characterizing Health Status Discrimination as a Section 1557 Violation 
Although section 1557 addresses protected class discrimination in health 
insurance, at times this cannot be entirely distinguished from distinct but 
overlapping questions of health status discrimination. This is because protect-
ed classes often represent the groups of unhealthy individuals that insurers 
seek to avoid. Is an insurer’s failure to cover a certain chronic pain drug dis-
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criminatory against those with chronic disease, against those who are disa-
bled, or even against women who experience this affliction higher than men? 
The other ACA antidiscrimination measures do not reach all forms of poten-
tially discriminatory conduct, and section 1557 can play a distinct but aug-
mentative role to that end. 
Not all of those who an insurer may consider to be “unhealthy” could al-
so be considered a member of a protected class. Yet, protected classes have 
historically been part of the group discriminated against by insurers,280 possi-
bly because of health and healthcare disparities that result from broader dis-
crimination and structural inequality.281 Consequently, individuals in a pro-
tected class and those categorized as unhealthy may be intersectional.282 Crit-
ical race scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw and others have theorized on the topic 
of intersectionality in civil rights.283 Their work embodies the idea that, alt-
hough the protected class model of civil rights law tends to treat groups as 
“mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis,” some groups will 
embody multiple protected class identities at once.284 For example, African 
American women are both women and a racial minority.285 Crenshaw argues 
that the civil rights approach of singular protected classes fails to capture the 
compounded discrimination that occurs when an individual occupies multiple 
disenfranchised identities.286 The courts may only recognize an individual as 
an African American or as a woman, but not acknowledge the unique hard-
ships of a black woman.287 As a result, protected classes can frequently sub-
sume the intersectional identity, meaning, for example, that an African Amer-
ican woman must either be identified as a woman or as an African American. 
If she is disparately impacted, she only has recourse if all women are statisti-
cally affected, or all black persons.288 Yet, because she is intersectional, she is 
seen as too unique compared with a protected class to represent all women or 
all African Americans.289 
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The interplay between protected class and the unhealthy in the ACA is 
similar. An African American woman might be discriminated against by an 
insurer because of her race and her gender, but also because of her perceived 
unhealthy status which may be driven by genetic or social factors related to 
her gender or race or neither. The ACA regulations will protect her from dis-
crimination on the basis of health, while the civil rights remedies may protect 
her from discrimination based on gender and race. Because the unhealthy can 
occupy several classes at once, and because different aspects of the ACA tar-
get different aspects of discrimination, it is critical that civil rights laws and 
other antidiscrimination laws be viewed collectively to determine whether 
they sufficiently confront all types of health insurance discrimination. 
The extent to which section 1557 is meant to combat health status dis-
crimination broadly remains unclear. Though section 1557 was never part of 
the broader legislative history of the ACA, scholars note that the general tone 
throughout the debates indicated the purpose to implement strong antidis-
crimination measures regarding healthcare.290 The ACA antidiscrimination 
provisions themselves never reference section 1557’s protections, apart from 
the EHB regulations which indicate that an EHB violation is not a per se sec-
tion 1557 violation.291 Although Congress may ultimately have intended to 
confine section 1557 to protected class issues, its function may have broader 
application in health insurance. 
Designed not only to fight protected class discrimination, but also to 
contribute to the broader battle of health status discrimination, section 1557 
has some unique attributes compared with other ACA antidiscrimination pro-
tections. Section 1557 provides a civil rights lens to better inform the regula-
tory process with respect to what is or is not discriminatory in the ACA. Alt-
hough the EHB regulation states that it is discriminatory to tier drugs on the 
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basis of disease without justification based on the price of the drug, it pro-
vides no doctrine for why such an action is discriminatory.292 Section 1557 
can go beyond a regulatory statement that a practice is discriminatory and 
supply a doctrinally-informed discussion of why the practice is discriminato-
ry. Section 1557 complaints and lawsuits may also be a public way of bring-
ing regulators’ attention to ongoing instances of discrimination that they can 
then address through regulation. 
A regulatory approach, however, may not have the flexibility to respond 
to new discriminatory innovations in the market in the way that section 1557 
claims can. Regulatory changes can be slow and, perhaps, politically impos-
sible. Likewise, as Reva Siegel warns in other civil rights contexts, discrimi-
natory practices “evolve as they are contested,” leading to a transformation of 
class treatment but not an abolishment of discrimination.293 One scholarly 
article has characterized the efforts to regulate evolving discrimination as a 
form of “whack-a-mole.”294 While insurers find new innovative ways to dis-
criminate, regulators slowly catch up and regulate, leading these insurers to 
find other unregulated avenues for discrimination. Section 1557 provides the 
potential threat of a lawsuit or a public complaint to OCR, which may be 
enough to change insurers’ conduct.295 Additionally, clear and unambiguous 
civil rights guidance from OCR can inform this process and reduce the need 
for lawsuits or civil rights complaints.296 Courts may also grant injunctions to 
stop discriminatory conduct before it gains traction.297 
Section 1557 may be able to monitor and contest age-old discriminatory 
insurance practices that have not been eradicated by the ACA. EHB regula-
tions only offer outlier analysis in that they will review for whether an insur-
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er’s practices have been going against the grain.298 But, this may be ineffec-
tive as “insurance discrimination is often based on long-standing and perva-
sive benefit-design customs” and relying only on outliers could miss “endem-
ic patterns of discrimination.”299 Section 1557 may reach broader and more 
entrenched practices of health status and protected class discrimination. 
IV. DOCTRINAL ISSUES RAISED BY SECTION 1557 IN HEALTH  
INSURANCE ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
Civil rights claims may play a critical role in eliminating discriminatory 
health insurance practices, both with respect to protected classes and health 
status discrimination. As a legal approach, however, civil rights actions pre-
sent inherent doctrinal features that are limiting in the context of health insur-
ance and broader health equity concerns. 
There are two critical doctrinal questions regarding section 1557’s utility 
in health insurance discrimination. First, civil rights laws have tended to per-
mit economic rationality as a defense to a claim of discrimination. This Part 
briefly discusses the extent to which this should be viewed as a permissible 
defense following the enactment of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). Sec-
ond, civil rights emphasize a formal vision of equality that may achieve much 
in eradicating health insurance discrimination. But, this vision of equality 
may, at times, miss the point when it comes to health insurance discrimina-
tion. 
A. Economic Rationality 
A major uncertainty regarding section 1557 claims is the extent to which 
insurers are permitted to argue actuarial fairness as a defense to a civil rights 
claim following the ACA, particularly for private insurers. Most civil rights 
statutes allow some form of defense based on rational economic conduct on 
the part of the defendant.300 In response to claims brought under Title VI, Ti-
tle IX, and the Age Discrimination Act, the defense would be framed as a 
“substantial legitimate justification.”301 Similarly, in regards to the Rehabilita-
tion Act, a defense can be raised if coverage of the benefit would amount to a 
fundamental alteration of the program.302 
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Historically, the public has accepted the practice of private insurers 
charging based on actuarial fairness, rather than social solidarity.303 Yet, ac-
ceptance of actuarial fairness is ambiguous in the ACA. The rate-setting pro-
visions seek to pool premiums primarily without respect to individual risk, 
though they do allow actuarially-relevant considerations around age, tobacco 
use, and geography.304 Conversely, the enrollment provisions and the mandate 
to purchase insurance seem to signal commitment to social solidarity by al-
lowing everyone to have the opportunity to purchase health insurance equal-
ly.305 The incorporation of the Rehabilitation Act instead of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in section 1557 may also signal a move away 
from actuarial fairness because the latter specifically exempts acts of discrim-
ination based on actuarial calculations unless they are a subterfuge to avoid 
the broader purpose of the law.306  
Although Essential Health Benefits (“EHB”) regulations agree that tier-
ing of all drugs for a particular condition might be discriminatory, they in-
clude a major caveat: that this practice is not discriminatory if it is justified by 
actuarial fairness because drugs on a particular tier actually do cost more.307 
Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the ACA’s maintenance of the for-profit 
private insurance industry signals a retention of at least some aspects of actu-
arial fairness.308 Notably, the proposed rule did not address this tension of 
economic discrimination. Timothy Jost states that the proposed rule fails to 
directly address the major discrimination question of “whether insurers can 
impose high cost-sharing or otherwise limit access to expensive drugs needed 
by certain disabled populations, like persons with AIDS.”309 
Because the private health insurance market has never been fully regu-
lated by civil rights laws, and because this market has been re-shaped by the 
other ACA antidiscrimination provisions, it is impossible to predict how the 
courts and agencies will consider the topic of permissibility of actuarial fair-
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ness as a defense in these types of cases. The courts could emphasize the pri-
vate business aspect of private insurance akin to other private industries and 
attempt to balance free markets concerned with profits on one hand, and dis-
crimination on the other.310 Other private industries have utilized this balance, 
for example regulation by civil rights in employment laws.311 Many of the 
forms of discrimination mentioned in this Article have business purposes be-
yond that of discriminating against a protected group. Cost-sharing has been 
linked to differential harm to poor persons and the chronically ill, but it can 
also be justified because it reduces moral hazard and wasteful healthcare 
spending.312 The civil rights encompassed in section 1557, however, all pre-
vent discrimination through the use of federal dollars, plain and simple, with-
out respect to the issue of free markets.313 Despite the status these insurers 
hold as private entities, section 1557 aims to ensure that federal dollars must 
not permit discrimination. 
Perhaps there is an argument to be made that price discrimination is not 
the type of discrimination that these civil rights laws forbid because the law is 
more worried about protecting classes of persons. This is not so simple, how-
ever, when you consider that protected class membership and health status 
can be so closely intertwined in health insurance, and that price discrimina-
tion can be discrimination against a protected class. Moreover, the harms to 
the insurance market resulting from the prohibition of discrimination based 
on price have been alleviated by medical loss ratios and risk adjustment, rein-
surance, and risk corridors.314 With this in mind, should it still be considered 
rational and justified for an insurer to discriminate based on price?  
Ultimately, the question of price discrimination raises a fundamental in-
ner tension within the ACA. Although section 1557 might significantly re-
strain discrimination in private insurance as a method of competition, the 
ACA ultimately retained private markets as a vehicle for financing healthcare, 
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likely with an idea of keeping insurance costs low through market competi-
tion.315 An overly heavy-handed approach by the courts in response may be 
unlikely, as they have historically shied away from what they perceive as 
health policy matters regarding the rationing of healthcare benefits.316 Courts 
may be unwilling to strike a balance between the free market and antidiscrim-
ination, particularly given that the matter has not been clearly addressed in the 
law or the accompanying rules.  
B. Formal vs. Substantive Equality in Health Benefits 
The role of formal equality resonates throughout civil rights laws and, 
therefore, presents a significant challenge to section 1557 claims.317 Formal 
equality emphasizes sameness of treatment such that all similarly situated 
persons should be treated equally and all groups must have an opportunity to 
access a given benefit.318 But, if unprotected classes do not have access to a 
benefit, then a vision of formal equality does not require the protected classes 
to have access either.319 Conversely, substantive equality recognizes that 
sameness of treatment might not address inequality and that some difference 
in treatment might be necessary to allow for a level playing field.320 Samuel 
Bagenstos has framed this standard in the context of disability and health in-
surance as a difference between access and content.321 When disabled parties 
seek to access the same benefits and treatments that non-disabled persons can 
enjoy, they have successfully stated a claim under both the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA.322 Yet, when they argue that the content of the benefits needs to 
change to accommodate a disabled group, they fail because the court is un-
willing to require a “fundamental alteration” to an insurance plan.323 Simply, 
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civil rights laws (or at least disability laws) only permit an examination of 
whether there is discrimination within the benefits already offered, but do not 
allow for arguments that additional benefits should be offered to better ad-
dress certain individuals’ special needs. 
Section 1557 does not require an insurer to cover a particular service, ra-
ther it states that “a covered entity cannot have a coverage policy that oper-
ates in a discriminatory manner.”324 Thus, section 1557 is not likely to engage 
the question of whether protected classes receive levels of care necessary for 
their well-being, but only that insurers must not discriminate on the basis of 
protected class in the coverage provided. Section 1557’s rule provides exam-
ples: a plan that covers bariatric surgery for adults cannot exclude those adults 
with developmental disabilities, or a plan that covers treatment for eating dis-
orders cannot cover inpatient care for men but not women.325 Yet, the plan is 
not required to cover the bariatric surgery or eating disorder treatment at all 
unless the EHB requires it.  
Additionally, the draft proposed rule for 1557 states that insurers cannot 
forbid all coverage for gender transition, as this would be discriminatory on 
the basis of gender.326 But, insurers could certainly respond by covering only 
low-cost procedures, such as hormones, while excluding high-cost proce-
dures, such as transition surgery. Likewise, in determining whether a 
transgender person has been discriminated against in access to benefits, the 
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) will first look to “whether and to what extent 
coverage is available when the same service is not related to gender transi-
tion.”327 For example, if a particular plan denies coverage for a hysterectomy 
that a patient’s provider describes as medically necessary for the treatment of 
gender dysphoria, OCR will evaluate and compare the plan’s coverage of 
hysterectomies in circumstances not related to gender dysphoria.328 As a re-
sult, this limits the reach of disparate impact claims brought forth by section 
1557 to claims of discrimination in already-covered benefits. 
Formal equality may pose a distinct challenge to plaintiffs seeking more 
comprehensive health insurance benefits, particularly those with complex 
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health needs. It is flawed because it fails to recognize that, in the financing of 
healthcare particularly, division of goods must necessarily be unequal.329 
People’s healthcare needs vary over their life cycle, some communities re-
quire more healthcare than others, and very few individuals will likely always 
consume a large majority of healthcare resources.330 Further, some vulnerable 
patients inevitably need services that no other comparator group will need. 
Transgender patients in Cruz argued that failure to cover certain hormone 
therapies was discriminatory.331 Under a formal equality framework, howev-
er, they only win if they can show that other patients who are not transgender 
receive those same therapies.332  
It also remains unclear as to how civil rights will apply when rationing 
leads to disadvantages for only some in a protected class, rather than the 
group as a whole. For example, many insurers are placing limits on, or failing 
to cover, the Hepatitis C drug Sovaldi, which costs $84,000 for a course of 
treatment.333 There may not be a disparate treatment case if the insurer opts 
not to cover the drug at all because nobody has access—whether in a protect-
ed class or not.334 If the insurer provides access to some, for example based 
on how serious one’s liver damage is, there may not be a viable disparate 
treatment suit because the question would be whether Hepatitis C patients are 
being treated differently from non-Hepatitis patients and it may be hard to 
prove a statistical harm.335 
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Some aspects of the ACA point more towards a vision of substantive 
equality, which may inspire a court to follow suit. For example, EHB regula-
tions require that single or extended release tablets be covered when they are 
medically appropriate.336 Mandating coverage of these drugs (and calling a 
failure to not cover it discrimination) is favorable to chronically ill patients, 
and may even reflect a recognition of HIV patients in particular that often 
take single tablet antiretrovirals. Though not every patient will need access to 
such drugs, the regulation recognizes a substantive fairness issue. Moreover, 
although section 1557’s proposed rule does not state that all transgender ser-
vices ought to be covered, it suggests that categorical bans of all types of ser-
vices for a protected group may be discriminatory.337 This may be another 
example of the regulations contradicting the formal equality model by allow-
ing for a claim to a positive right to a benefit regardless of how or if it is 
made available to the non-protected group.338 
Although a formal equality framework enhances equality in health in-
surance benefits, it does not go as far as substantive equality. To the extent 
that lawsuits under section 1557 continuously fail because of this issue, regu-
latory efforts may be more important. Section 1557 or EHB regulations may 
be able to address some visions of substantive equality by simply mandating 
coverage of a certain benefit for a certain group. For example, the section 
1557 proposed rules simply declare that it is discriminatory not to cover some 
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aspect of gender transition care.339 Without a requirement in the regulations 
that insurers cover certain types of benefits, insurers may choose simply not 
to cover a benefit rather than have to provide it to all groups equally. 
Section 1557 can do much to fight both protected class and health status 
discrimination in health benefits, but it is not a panacea. A number of the doc-
trinal limitations inherent in civil rights may prevent section 1557 from realiz-
ing universal access to all necessary benefits. Rather, section 1557 is best read 
as one of several antidiscrimination provisions of the ACA that can work in 
concert to tackle health insurance discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 1557 or a similar provision is likely to remain in health insur-
ance, regardless of the future of health reform. The original intent behind the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which became the model for future civil rights laws 
incorporated into section 1557, was that “simple justice requires that public 
funds, to which all taxpayers of all races [colors, and national origins] con-
tribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes 
or results in racial [color or national origin] discrimination.”340 The idea of 
simple justice in government funds is consonant with Deborah Stone’s social 
solidarity model presented previously.341 That is, simple justice requires that 
the common fund paid in by all insureds through premiums not be used in a 
way that further entrenches disparities, whether health status-based or health 
disparities-based. As long as any version of health reform brings federal dol-
lars into the healthcare arena there will be an opportunity to apply these broad 
civil rights protections.342  
Section 1557 substantively builds on the other, better-known provisions 
of the ACA that combat health insurance discrimination while also uniquely 
protecting vulnerable groups in health insurance. It can play a significant role 
in eliminating health disparities related to health insurance discrimination and 
can contribute to broader health equity. However, civil rights laws will not be 
the cure-all for every aspect of health insurance discrimination because they 
include a number of doctrinal limitations. Fundamentally, section 1557 can 
bring healthcare closer to social solidarity by pushing society to examine 
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whether benefits are being equally offered across groups and determining to 
what extent courts can permit economic discrimination in the face of harms to 
protected classes. Section 1557, like the ACA, however, is not a form of uni-
versal coverage. As a civil rights provision, section 1557 may not engage well 
with questions of universal access and substantive equality, or of whether an 
insurer must cover a given benefit in order to make the system more equita-
ble. 
Inevitably, section 1557 and the wider antidiscrimination agenda of the 
ACA in addressing the issue of freedom from discrimination in insurance 
come close to reaching broader issues of a right to healthcare. They also raise 
a fundamental, broader question about the purpose of civil rights protections 
and antidiscrimination protections in health insurance: should we worry about 
health status discrimination because it may further entrench already disadvan-
taged groups, or do we worry about it as an issue in and of itself?343 To that 
end, what are the best remedies and which forms of discrimination should we 
inhibit? The role that civil rights doctrine can and will play in these broader 
questions of health equity is ripe for further legal and theoretical study. 
                                                                                                                           
 343 See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 22, at 6–7, 33–35; Roberts, supra note 24, at 1166–70. 
